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Can Afghans Reintegrate 
after Assisted Return  
from Europe? 
Insights from the project ‘Possibilities and Realities of Return Migration’  
 
Governments present the 
assisted return of rejected 
asylum seekers and other 
‘unwanted’ migrants as the 
cornerstone of an effective 
migration management policy. 
However, it is also a practice 
criticised by migrants’ rights 
advocates for being a form of 
coerced, rather than voluntary, 
return. One response to critiques 
is to highlight the potential such 
programmes have in the 
successful reintegration of 
returnees. But what is meant by 
‘successful’ reintegration? Based 
on research in Afghanistan with 
returnees from Norway and the 
United Kingdom, we highlight 
the extreme difficulties faced in 
achieving reintegration. 
 
 Brief Points 
 Most Afghan research participants 
did not want to return to 
Afghanistan; although those with 
secure residence status in Europe 
were willing to visit. 
 Insecurity, lack of livelihood 
opportunities and distrust of the 
Afghan government were stated 
reasons for not returning. 
 The term ‘reintegration’ should be 
questioned; our research showed that 
reintegration could be just as 
complicated as migrant integration. 
 Reintegration is particularly difficult 
to achieve when returnees did not 
want to return in the first place. 
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Figure 1. Afghanistan, Norway, the United 
Kingdom and other countries in the 
PREMIG project 
Managed migration and return 
Managed migration is a controversial topic. 
Viewed positively, it is as an acceptance that in 
a globalised world people want to be mobile, 
and they should be enabled to be so in an 
ordered and safe manner. However, for most 
Afghans managed migration means re-
strictions on mobility. European managed 
migration policies mean being unable to get a 
visa, entering in an irregular manner (e.g. 
with the assistance of smugglers) after a costly 
and dangerous journey, and undergoing an 
often drawn-out asylum process with the risk 
of detention and removal. 
The International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM) considers return policy a cornerstone 
of effective migration management, alongside 
border controls and visa regimes. According 
to the IOM’s training guide, Essentials of Mi-
gration Management, an asylum-related re-
turns policy requires effective border controls, 
a timely asylum adjudication system and a 
combination of voluntary return programmes 
and enforced returns for those whose asylum 
claims are rejected. This last aspect is seen as 
essential to ensure the integrity of interna-
tional refugee protection: in other words, if 
people are deemed to not be in need of protec-
tion then they should not be allowed to stay, 
else why have an asylum determination pro-
cess at all? Whilst this may be legitimate in 
policy terms, for Afghans, many of whom 
have borrowed tens of thousands of dollars to 
reach Europe, their case being rejected is a 
dismal prospect. 
For Afghans without leave to remain in Nor-
way or the UK, there are four options: 
1 use their own resources to return to  
Afghanistan or migrate elsewhere; 
2 agree to return to Afghanistan through an 
assisted return program; 
3 wait to be ‘removed’ (forcibly returned), 
sometimes following a period of detention;  
4 go ‘under the radar’ and try and evade the 
authorities, whilst either working outside 
the formal sector or facing destitution. 
Political, physical and economic insecurity in 
Afghanistan make the first option extremely 
unlikely for all but a tiny number of Afghans 
in Europe. Option four is unsupportable both 
in terms of mainstream public opinion and 
the potential risks to migrants’ health, securi-
ty and rights, which leaves options two and 
three available to migration policy-makers. 
Forced removals are expensive – more so than 
assisted return1 – especially when the cost of 
detention prior to removal is included. They 
are also politically costly due to the potential 
damage they can do to European countries’ 
reputations as protectors of human rights. In 
contrast, assisted return can only take place 
with the consent of the returnee, so it can be 
publicly presented as voluntary return.  
The language of assisted return 
Does consenting to assisted return really 
constitute voluntary return? What is the mean-
ing of the word voluntary here? Despite call-
ing their programs Assisted Voluntary Re-
turn, in the Essentials of Migration 
Management, IOM makes the distinction 
between ‘voluntary [return] without compul-
sion’ and ‘voluntary [return] under compul-
sion’, the latter referring to those who have no 
legal permission to stay. Assisted voluntary 
return programs have been criticized by 
scholars, migrants’ rights advocates and UN-
HCR, who point out that ‘voluntary return’ 
should imply that there is a plausible legal 
alternative to returning, rather than return in 
the face of a total lack of regularized alterna-
tives. Notably, the Norwegian Directorate of 
Immigration (UDI) has recently dropped the 
word ‘voluntary’ from their assisted return 
programmes.  
The coincidence of forced and ‘voluntary’ 
return programmes has, and should, also be 
questioned by critical scholars. In both Nor-
way and the United Kingdom, assisted return 
programs to Afghanistan have been estab-
lished at around the same time as enforced 
removal commenced. Is the fact that some 
Afghans ‘choose’ return used to justify the 
forcible return of others? 
Migration policy-makers have responded to 
criticisms of return policy by highlighting the 
potential that reintegration assistance (built in 
to assisted return to Afghanistan) has in sup-
porting returnees’ contributions to post-
conflict reconstruction. In the United King-
dom the term reintegration is explicitly built 
into return policy, through the cross-
governmental Return and Reintegration 
Fund. The inclusion of reintegration allows 
for the involvement of the Department for 
International Development in what could 
otherwise be considered a domestic matter.  
Afghans’ views on possible return 
Prior to fieldwork in Afghanistan, we con-
ducted research in Norway and the United 
Kingdom with Afghans on their thoughts 
about, and experiences of, return. This pro-
vides important contextual information.  
Firstly, although some research participants 
were interested in returning eventually, most 
were not planning to do so in the near future. 
Nevertheless, many with European passports 
had made short-term visits, mostly for family 
reasons.  
Secondly, those considering assisted return 
were only doing so because their legal options 
for staying in Europe had been exhausted. 
Assisted return was preferable to forced re-
moval, because of the financial assistance. 
However, financial assistance was not enough 
to encourage return if they had a feasible 
option of staying in Europe. We expected that 
assisted return might be chosen as a ‘more 
dignified’ alternative to forced removal, per-
haps mitigating potential stigma after return; 
however, research participants were unsure 
friends and family in Afghanistan would 
recognise the distinction between the two.  
PRIO POLICY BRIEF 07 2015  www.prio.org 
  
Housing extends up the hillsides on the outskirts of Kabul. Finding accommodation is among the challenges faced by returnees to Afghanistan. (Photo: Carol Mitchell, Flickr.) 
Thirdly, we observed mistrust of assisted 
return programs, particularly in regard to 
reintegration assistance, with some suspicious 
that they would not receive promised assis-
tance once they returned to Afghanistan, as 
they saw the return program’s primary aim as 
removing them from Europe.   
Afghans’ experiences post-return 
For most research participants, life after re-
turning to Afghanistan had been difficult. 
This was compounded by the fact that most 
had not wanted to leave Europe in the first 
place. Most of them wanted to leave Afghani-
stan again, if the opportunity arose, similar to 
findings from a study of 120 returnees from 
the United Kingdom, which found 74% want-
ed to leave Afghanistan2. Our research partic-
ipants described a number of difficulties. 
Firstly, a small minority had faced specific 
threats after returning, usually in the form of 
violent demands for money, perhaps – as one 
interviewee suggested – because people who 
had been in Europe were assumed to be 
wealthy, although in reality most had returned 
with little or no savings. Another assumption 
returnees faced was that they had become 
‘westernised’ or ‘anti-Islamic’ in Europe. One 
was even threatened that he had to give mon-
ey to an insurgency group to prove his non-
western credentials. For a larger proportion, it 
was fear of (rather than direct) violence, that 
was affecting them, resulting in being unable 
to leave the house and gain employment. 
Some moved regularly from family member 
to family member – partly to avoid outstaying 
hospitality but also for security reasons and to 
avoid ‘settling in’, which would disrupt plans 
to re-migrate.  
Secondly, un/underemployment was a major 
problem. The nature of hiring practices in 
Afghanistan means those who did not have 
strong social connections, or were trying to 
keep a low public profile, could not find work. 
For others, the corrupt working environment 
was unbearable. Here, the livelihoods compo-
nent of reintegration assistance (managed by 
IOM) could help. However, many of the re-
search participants who had received IOM 
assistance were unhappy with it. In part, their 
unhappiness can be related to the fact that 
most did not want to be back in Afghanistan, 
and no assistance was going to change that. 
Nevertheless, there were specific problems 
that multiple research participants noted, such 
as rushed meetings with IOM caseworkers, 
and/or a feeling that caseworkers took a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ approach to business-planning 
advice rather than a tailored response to their 
individual needs and skills. Also, sometimes 
face-to-face follow-up by caseworkers did not 
take place due to security constraints.  
Thirdly, many felt they had disappointed their 
family, who had saved or borrowed money to 
pay for their migration. Now, rather than being 
a source of remittance income, the returnees 
were often a drain on household resources, 
and consequently, felt disempowered within 
the family structure. A noticeable trend 
amongst younger research participants was 
that one of the first things they did after re-
turn was get married – could this be a way of 
trying to renegotiate membership (and adult 
identity) in Afghan social and cultural life?  
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 Why is reintegration difficult? 
If returns are taking place, reintegration 
should be part of return policy. It would ap-
pear to be beneficial to all involved, particular-
ly the returnee themselves and the society 
they are returning to. Migration policy-makers 
aiming to reduce immigration might also 
hope that successful reintegration of return-
ees will lessen re-migration. But what is really 
meant by the term reintegration? Is it just a 
buzzword used to justify returns or is it a 
process that can be enabled by assisted return 
programs? The prefix ‘re’ suggests that re-
turnees are going back to something known to 
them, but is this really the case? There are 
number of practical reasons why this may not 
be the case for Afghans.  
Firstly, some are rejected because Kabul is 
deemed safe for them even if their province of 
origin is not. This can mean reintegrating to 
an urban area and lifestyle they have little or 
no experience of. Secondly, the conflict in 
Afghanistan is over 35 years old. Many Af-
ghans have spent much of their life outside of 
Afghanistan, particularly in Pakistan or Iran. 
Thirdly, even for those who grew up in Kabul, 
they and Afghanistan will have changed in 
their absence. All this makes reintegration not 
straightforward. Given this, we suggest that it 
is useful to re-examine the term ‘reintegra-
tion’ by looking at the term ‘integration’. 
There is an established literature on integra-
tion (in contrast to limited literature on rein-
tegration). We consider integration to be the 
process whereby migrants negotiate member-
ship in their new places of settlement; in 
social, economic, cultural and political terms. 
It is a two-way process, which recognises the 
important role of non-migrants. Secondly, 
whilst there are many practical elements 
(finding accommodation, employment,  
learning languages, civic involvement) we 
should also consider socio-cultural and emo-
tional aspects (feeling ‘at home’, being accept-
ed, making friends). Consequently, reintegra-
tion can also be considered a process of 
(re)negotiating membership in both practical 
and socio-cultural terms.  
Is (assisted) reintegration possible? 
It is clear that our research participants are 
struggling to (re)negotiate their membership 
in Afghan society. Practical aspects of reinte-
gration (protection, accommodation and 
employment) were contingent on social net-
works. Socio-cultural reintegration was also 
challenging, especially for those who do not 
have local social networks. Even those with 
family struggled, due to their perceived failure 
in Europe and inability to financially support 
their household.  
Those providing reintegration assistance face 
a difficult task. Considering reintegration 
equivalent to integration – a long complex 
process – shows why it is difficult. For exam-
ple, assistance provided tends to be short-
term. Migrants would not be expected to 
integrate in six months, so why returnees? 
Assistance is also hampered by a narrow 
understanding of what reintegration means. 
That reintegration is a process that could start 
prior to departure is not recognised; instead, 
assistance is only given in Afghanistan. Social 
capital seems to be the most important re-
source available to returnees; yet activities that 
strengthen networks (including with family, 
and potentially, other returnees) are not prior-
itised. Reintegration assistance provided 
focuses on business-planning and finding 
employment, but is not based on labour mar-
ket or skills assessment, with most research 
participants being advised to start a small 
business, whatever their skills and experience.  
However, ultimately, the reintegration of 
Afghan returnees is shaped by the fact that 
even those who consented to assisted return 
mostly do not want to be in Afghanistan. They 
look outwards, towards future migration, as 
they do not trust the Afghan government to 
provide them with services or a stable secure 
environment. This will make reintegration 
difficult whatever assistance is provided. 
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Notes 
1 National Audit Office report (2008) Final report: 
costing work stream – NAO asylum study, NAO: 
UK. 2 Majidi, N. (2009) ‘Understanding the return 
and reintegration process of Afghan returnees from 
the UK’ for Altai Consulting, commissioned by DFID 
Afghanistan. 
Social capital seems to be the most important 
resource available to returnees; yet activities that 
strengthen networks are not prioritised. 
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